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 1 
Summary 
With often large amounts involved, the issue of unsafe ports is of great 
interest for both the shipowner and the charterer in order to establish what 
kind of risk they would bear under a voyage. 
 
This thesis deals with the relationship between the shipowner and the 
charterer when the shipowner has suffered a loss due to an unsafe port. The 
question is to what extent it is possible to hold the charterer liable for such 
loss. The thesis deal with both English and Scandinavian law, and it will be 
possible to make comparisons of the both legal systems.  
 
The starting point is the contract between the two parties, also known as the 
charterparty, where it could be regulated which party should stand the risk 
for damages due to unsafe port. It is however very seldom straight forward 
and will depend on the type of charterparty and whether it would be 
interpreted under English or Scandinavian law. The regulations in regards to 
different kinds of warranties is also dealt with, in connection with the 
charterparties. 
 
There is further a thorough review of the aspects of the port itself, i.e. what 
elements would be needed to consider a port unsafe. Under English law, 
there are many different examples of various dangers, both physical but also 
political, where it under Scandinavian law is a more general view that is 
held. 
 
In addition, exceptions such as unexpected and abnormal occurrences as 
well as the master’s obligation to avoid certain dangers is analysed. Under 
the Scandinavian law, the concept of negligence is reviewed, as this is the 
useable principle in the Scandinavian countries.  
 
Finally, also the scope of the liability, i.e. what costs that successfully can 
be claimed against the charterer if he is deemed responsible is being dealt 
with. 
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Sammanfattning 
Med ofta stora summor involverade i ärenden relaterade till osäkra hamnar 
är det av stort intresse för både redaren och befraktaren att etablera deras 
respektive risk de har under en resa. 
 
Den här uppsatsen behandlar relationen mellan redaren och befraktaren då 
redaren har åsamkats skada på grund av en osäker hamn. Frågan är till 
vilken grad det är möjligt att hålla befraktaren ansvarig för en sådan skada. 
Uppsatsen kommer behandla både engelsk och skandinavisk rätt, och det 
kommer vara möjligt att jämföra de båda rättssystemen. 
 
Utgångspunkten är kontraktet mellan de två parterna, även kallat 
certepartiet, där det kan vara reglerat vilken part som skall hållas ansvarig 
för skador på grund av en osäker hamn. Det är dock väldigt sällan som det 
är rättframt, och det beror på vilken typ av certeparti samt om densamma 
blir tolkad under engelsk eller skandinavisk rätt. Bestämmelserna gällande 
olika typer av garantier avhandlas i samband med certepartierna. 
 
Vidare kommer de olika egenskaperna av själva hamnen noggrant att gås 
igenom, det vill säga, vilka element som är nödvändiga för att en hamn skall 
anses vara osäker. Under engelsk rätt finns det många olika exempel av 
olika faror, både fysiska och politiska, medan det i skandinavisk rätt är mer 
generellt reglerat. 
 
Även undantag, så som oväntade och onormala händelser, liksom kaptenens 
skyldighet att undvika vissa faror, analyseras. Under skandinavisk rätt 
utreds konceptet oaktsamhet då detta är den användbara principen i 
skandinaviska länder. 
 
Avslutningsvis utreds även omfattningen av ansvaret, det vill säga vilka 
kostnader som är möjliga att kräva mot befraktaren om han anses skyldig. 
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Preface 
I dedicate this essay to all my friends I have met in Lund and specially those 
at Göteborgs Nation. Without you, I would probably have much better 
grades, and a much more boring life. Thank you. 
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Abbreviations 
cf.  confer, meaning “compare” 
e.g.  exempli gratia, meaning “for example” 
etc.  et cetera, meaning “and other things” 
ibid ibidem, meaning “in the same place”, used in the 
footnotes to indicate that the source is the same 
as the previous footnote. 
i.e.  id est, meaning “that is” or “in other words” 
ND  Nordiska Domar i Sjöfartsfrågor 
NM  Nautical Mile, equal to 1852 meter 
UAE  United Arab Emirates 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
There has always been an issue of unsafety involved in shipping, both due 
to the exposure the vessel is faced in regards to weather and winds, but also 
in regards to political unsafety, for example, during the world wars in 
Europe or in other politically unsafe areas in the world. This unsafety factor 
often unfolds in the ports where the vessel will be exposed to narrower 
navigation and shallower water.  
 
There are different types of ports, some manmade and some natural. The 
manmade ports can vary in size and be everything from a big multiberth 
port with plenty of protection against the sea and wind, to a simpler jetty. In 
some areas in the world, for example, parts of Africa and the west coast of 
South America, some vessels are not even able to berth at the jetty, but have 
to transfer the goods to other, smaller vessels.
1
 
 
When talking about damage due to unsafe ports, it is not the damage caused 
to the vessel due to the charterer’s handling of the vessel, such as loading 
and unloading, but the damage related to the orders of the charterer.
2
 The 
case law in regards to unsafe ports and the dispute between the shipowner 
and the charterer stretches all the way back to the middle of the 19
th
 
century.
3
 
 
Nowadays, the issue of unsafe ports is more relevant and important than 
ever, as over 90% of the global trade is carried by sea
4
 and as per December 
2010, there were 104 304 merchant vessels with no less than 100 gross 
tonnes registered, most of them calling port regularly.
5
 In addition, the 
vessels are getting larger
6
 with increased drafts; this, in turn, impose more 
requirements on the ports. 
 
In the world of shipping, there are many interests on different levels, from 
cargo owners, stevedores and charterers, to shipowners, investors and 
insurers. One of all relationships is the one between the shipowner and the 
charterer, reflected in the contract between them, also known as a 
charterparty. Depending on the type of the charterparty, whether it is a 
                                                 
1
 Hans Peter Michelet, Håndbok i Tidsbefraktning, Oslo, Sjörettsfondet, 1997, p. 74. 
2
 Jan Ramberg, Unsafe ports and berths, Oslo, Universitetsförlaget, 1967, p. 17. 
3
 Ogden v. Graham, 1861, 1 B & S 773. 
4
 International Maritime Organisation, International Shipping Facts and Figures: 
Information Resources on Trade, Safety, Security, Environment (Updated March 2012), p. 
7. 
5
Ibid, p. 9. 
6
Today, for example, the largest container vessels can hold up to 18 000 containers and are 
about 400 meters long and 60 meters wide. 
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voyage- or time charterparty, the charterer has an express or implied 
obligation to nominate a safe port. 
 
Should the vessel suffer damage while entering the port or berth, staying 
there or leaving it due to the various reasons there is a question on who take 
the risk for the damage - the charterer who has decided that the vessel 
should go there, or the shipowner who is generally responsible for his vessel 
and crew.  
 
 
1.2 Purpose and scope 
It is of great interest for both the shipowner and the charterer including their 
respective insurers to know where the responsibility line is drawn between 
the two parties as substantial amounts could be involved. Therefore, the 
main purpose of this thesis is to analyse the charterer’s liability in respect to 
damage incurred to the shipowner’s vessel due to an unsafe port. Among 
other relevant issues, dealt with in this thesis, the types of dangers that could 
render a port unsafe are described. Also, the charterparty contract pertaining 
to safe port obligations will be analysed by examining the most common 
standard charterparty forms. Finally, the type of liability incurred on the 
charterer under both English and Scandinavian law and types of damages 
that are recoverable will be considered. As noted, the core of this thesis is 
the charterer's liability for unsafe ports under a charterparty contract. Thus, 
the liability of the shipowner is beyond the scope of this thesis. The 
discussion on safe port obligations hinges mainly on the time charterparty as 
the charterer has more freedom to nominate ports while using the vessel for 
a longer period of time unlike in the voyage charterparty which regulates 
carriage of goods between two ports. The bareboat charterparty will only be 
briefly mentioned in section 2.2.1.3, however not further analysed. 
 
In this thesis, both English and Scandinavian law will be examined along 
with the contractual arrangements between the parties as reflected in 
standard charterparties.  
 
It must be observed that the choice of English law is important as it is highly 
influencing on the international maritime law in general.  Moreover, a 
number of leading decisions regarding the carriage of goods by sea are 
stemming from the English courts, in particular, the Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales and the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, 
previously known as the House of Lords. Those judgments have a 
considerable impact in common law jurisdictions but also provide guidance 
for courts in civil law countries. Finally, it is not least to say that the 
charterparties are very often referring to English law and English 
jurisdiction that will govern a dispute. 
 
As noted above, the Scandinavian law will be represented by Swedish and 
Norwegian law, hence the Danish law will be excluded in this thesis.  
 7 
1.3 Method and material 
In chapters two and three a traditional legal dogmatic method will be used,  
meaning that the different legal sources are analysed and applied in order to 
examine the legal question posed in the thesis, i.e. to evaluate the difficulties 
in assessing liability between the shipowner and the charterer. In these 
chapters the English and Scandinavian law in relation to safe port 
obligations are described in order to provide the basis for Chapter 4. It must 
be noted that in the second chapter, where English law is discussed, 
common law will be predominant, meaning that case law will be the main 
source. However, the scholarly writings will be used to supplement the 
analysis of the applicable court cases.  
 
In the third chapter where Scandinavian law is discussed the main source 
will be statute law and associated preparatory works, however, the scholarly 
writings will also be used.  
 
In chapter four, a comparative analysis between the English law system and 
the Scandinavian law system is conducted. This intends to reveal similarities 
and differences as well as the advantages and disadvantages of both 
systems.  
 
In addition to the above-mentioned legal sources, also some standard  
charterparty forms, i.e. the contracts between charterers and shipowners, 
will be analysed in order to evaluate the different wordings relating to the 
concept of unsafe port. 
 
 
1.4 Disposition 
Following this introduction chapter, Chapter 2 deals with the concept of 
unsafe ports under the English law system.  It mainly draws on the English 
law of contracts and torts. The case law of the English courts is extensively 
discussed and analysed.  
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the  Scandinavian law system, specifically Norwegian 
and Swedish law. Notably, maritime law is unified in Norway, Sweden and 
Denmark through the Scandinavian Maritime Codes common for all 
countries with some minor variations. The chapter includes the statute law 
and the related preparatory works as well as some case law.  
 
Chapter 4 conducts a comparative analysis of two legal systems and reveals 
differences and similarities with respect to safe port obligations and liability 
of the charterer.  
 
 8 
In the final Chapter 5 the author summarises and concludes the different 
findings made in the previous chapters and provides some further proposals 
and solution of the problem. 
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2 English System 
2.1 Introduction 
The test for whether or not a port is considered safe has been left to the 
common law. Even though the law seems well established in regards to the 
safe port, there are still many exceptions, and the question, whether a port is 
actually safe or not will be about a matter of fact. 
 
If the vessel suffers damage as a result of the conditions at the port, 
including grounding, weather, ice, seized or damaged due to warlike 
activities etc, the owner of the vessel can seek damages from the charterer 
alleging a breach of charterparty.
7
 
 
This chapter examines different issues, which need to be answered in order 
to find out whether the shipowner has a right to claim damages against 
charterers for unsafe port under the English law. Firstly, the charterparty 
will be reviewed in order to set the framework of the contract. Then, the 
next question is whether the port is unsafe or not. Thirdly, the chapter 
investigates whether the charterers could be held liable if the port is 
considered unsafe, and finally, what types of costs are recoverable. 
 
 
2.2 Warranties 
The starting point when determining whether the charterers could be held 
liable for damages caused by an unsafe port is to analyse the contract, or the 
charterparty, between the shipowner and the charterer. The question is 
whether the charterer has warranted the characteristics of the port in the way 
of safety, and thus could be held liable for that.  
 
There are a number of standard charterparties, some of them will be 
reviewed in the below subsections; however, as some charterparties have 
different wordings the relevant charterparty has to be reviewed in order to 
determine the charterer’s liability. Many charterparties, and specially time 
charters
8
 have provisions requiring nomination of safe ports; however, in 
most charterparties there are only a few words in regards to this, hence the 
courts have developed several rules regarding the obligation imposed upon 
charterers.
9
 
 
When the charterparty names a port or a berth and at the same time uses the 
word “safe” or alike to describe the port or berth, then this is generally 
                                                 
7
 Johan Schelin, Modern law of Charterparties, 9 ed, Hässelby, Colloquium, 2001, p.46. 
8
 For example NYPE 1946 where it states: “Between safe port and or ports in...”. 
9
 Presentation by Mr Smith, Mills and Co. Solicitors. 
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interpreted as an expressed warranty. In The “Archimidis”,10 the 
charterparty stated “one safe port Ventspils” and this was considered a 
warranty by the charterer as to the safety of the named port. In a similar 
case, The “Livanita”11, the wording “one time charter trip via St 
Petersburg…” combined with “trading to be worldwide between safe ports, 
safe berths and anchorages and places…” did contain an express warranty as 
to the safety of St Petersburg.  
 
It will also be considered a warranty when the charterparty states that the 
charterer is to nominate a “safe” berth or port, even if no port is listed.12 In 
this situation, i.e. when it is stated that the vessel should load or discharge at 
a port “to be nominated”, once the port has been effectively nominated the 
status will be as it had been written down in the charterparty from the 
beginning.
13
 Some examples
14
 of expressed warranties are found in Baltime 
01, NYPE 46 and NYPE 93, where it in the latter is stated that the vessel 
shall be employed between “safe ports and safe places.”15  
 
In the court case, The “Ternauzen”16 the vessel was damaged due to  
grounding during loading operations. The charterparty stated that the vessel 
should be directed to a port “where she can lie safely afloat or safe aground 
where steamers of similar size and draft are accustomed to lie aground in 
safety”. The provision was considered a warranty, and despite the fact it said 
that the vessel could lie aground the judge held that the berth in question 
was not one which the vessel could lie safely while loading the designated 
cargo. 
 
In some charterparties, there will be no written provision that the port 
should be safe. Instead, in some cases the court will hold that there is an 
implied term that the port must be safe. Such an implied term will depend 
on the charterparty’s overall wording. For example, in cases with political 
unsafety due to war etc. the presence of a comprehensive war risk clause can 
cause the court to hold that the charterers were not obliged to nominate a 
port safe from war risks.
17
 
 
If the charterparty, on the other hand, names the port or berth, or refer  to 
one or more ports out of a list with named ports, and still does not include 
the word ”safety” or alike, then the charterer will probably not be under any 
obligation as no warranty is implied from the provision. However, the 
charterer must probably not nominate an “impossible” port, which will 
                                                 
10
 AIC Ltd v. Marine Pilot Ltd (The “Archimidis”), 2008, 1 Lloyds Rep 597. 
11
 STX Pan Ocean Co Limited v. Ugland Bulk Transport AS (The “Livanita”), 2008, Vol 1. 
12
 G.W. Grace & Co. Ltd. v. General Steam Navigation Company. Ltd. (The “Sussex 
Oak”), 1950, 83 Lloyds Rep 297. 
13
 Boyd et al., Scrutton on Charterparties, 21 ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008, p. 117. 
14
 See further in subsection 2.2.1 regarding the different charterparties. 
15
 NYPE 93, clause 5. 
16
 Lensen Shipping Ltd. v. Anglo-Soviet Shipping Co. Ltd (The “Terneuzen”), 1935, 52 
Lloyds Rep 141. 
17
 Aegean Sea Traders Corporation v. Repsol Petroleo S.A. and another (The “Aegean 
Sea”), 1998, 2 Lloyds Rep 39. 
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depend on the terms of the charterparty in full and the nature of the 
impossibility.
18
  
 
In the court case The “Reborn”,19 the vessel was on a voyage charter and 
there was no express warranty as to the safety of the port nominated by 
charterers. Neither did the court find an implied warranty as to the safety of 
the berth since the port was named in the charterparty. The common 
assumption in such a case is that the shipowner has satisfied himself that the 
particular ports nominated for loading and discharge are safe and suitable 
for the particular vessel before agreeing to the charterparty.
20
 Hence, more 
often safe port obligation will be contained in a time charterparty rather than 
in a voyage charterparty. The position can be different where there is a wide 
range of ports that the vessel may be required to go to by the charterer.
21
 
This is because the owners are not expected to know all ports, and also it is 
the charterer taking the benefit of being able to exploit the vessel 
commercially to a larger extent.  
 
If the parties agree on a more comprehensive clause relating to nomination 
of ports then this prevails. For example, it is common in many tanker 
charters
22
 to have a more extensive clause regarding unsafe ports. These 
charterparties provide that the charterers are obliged to exercise due 
diligence; however, there is no express warranty regarding the safety of the 
port which leads to more responsibility for the shipowners. Some standard 
clauses exist in order to further govern the position between owners and 
charterers in unsafe port situations, for example, standard ice clauses, which 
are described further in section 2.3.5. 
 
In some charterparties, it could be stated that the vessel should trade 
between safe berths rather than safe ports. Briefly, it can be explained that 
where the safety of the berth is warranted but not the port, then the berth 
must be able to be reached safely within the port
23
. This is further examined 
in section 2.3. 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. Australian Wheat Board (The “Houston City”), 1956, 1 
Lloyds Rep 1. 
19
 Mediterranean Salvage & Towage Ltd. v. Seamar Trading & Commerce inc. (The 
“Reborn”), 2009, 2 Lloyds Rep 639. 
20
 Atkins International H.A. v. Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (The “APJ Priti”), 
1987, 2 Lloyds Rep 37. 
21
 Vardinoyannis v. The Egyptian General Petroleum Corp. (The “Evaggelos”), 1971, 2 
Lloyds Rep 200. 
22
 For example Shelltime 4 and Intertankvoy 76. 
23
 Atkins International H.A. v. Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (The “APJ Priti”), 
1987, 2 Lloyds Rep 37, p. 40. 
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2.2.1 Charterparties 
The charterparty is the contract between the shipowner and the charterer, i.e. 
the hirer, or the party that is entitled to use the vessel.
24
  
 
There are three main categories of charters, namely time-, voyage- and 
bareboat charters.
25
 Each of the categories has their own type of contracts 
and their own characteristics, which will be briefly explained below.  
 
 
2.2.1.1 Time charter 
A time charterparty can be described as per Mr. Justice Donaldson in the 
case The “Berge Tasta”26: 
 
Under a time charter-party…the shipowner undertakes to make the vessel 
available to the charterer for the purposes of undertaking ballast and loaded 
voyages as required by the charterer within a specified area over a stated 
period. The shipowner's remuneration known as "time chartered freight" or 
"hire" is at a fixed rate for a unit of time regardless of how the vessel is used 
by the charterer. Risk of delay thus falls on the charterer. The shipowner 
meets the cost of maintaining the vessel and paying the crew's wages, but the 
cost of fuel and port charges fall on the charterer. 
 
The charterer has, hence, quite extensive options in regards to where he may 
send the vessel and what to transport, even though sometimes the 
charterparty can stipulate a restriction of area.
27
 Below follows some 
examples of standard time charterparty wordings in regards to safe port.  
 
2.2.1.1.1 Gentime28 
In clause 2 of the charterparty the trading limits indicate an express 
warranty, namely “The vessel shall be employed in lawful trades…between 
safe ports or safe places where she can safely enter, lie always afloat, and 
depart.”  
 
2.2.1.1.2 Boxtime29 
The Boxtime is quite similar to the Gentime in the wording, “The vessel 
shall be employed in lawful trades…between safe ports or places where she 
can safely lie always afloat.”  
 
                                                 
24
Boyd et al., Scrutton on Charterparties, 21 ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008, p. 3. 
25
 Hans Jacob Bull & Thor Falkanger, Innföring I Sjörett, 6 ed, Oslo, Sjörettsfondet, 2004, 
pp. 221-222. 
26
 Skibsaktieselskapet Snefonn, Skibsaksjeselskapet Bergesend & Co. V. Kawasaki Kisen 
Kaisha Ltd (The ”Berge Tasta”), 1975, 1 Lloyds Rep 422, p. 424. 
27
 Coghlin et al, Time charters, 6 ed, London, Informa, 2008, p. 133. 
28
 The Bimco General Time Charterparty, Issued 1999 (Gentime). 
29
 The Bimco Uniform Time Charterparty for container vessels (Boxtime). 
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2.2.1.1.3 Baltime30 
Also, in the Baltime charterparty, the wording is quite similar, “The vessel 
to be employed in lawful trades…only between good and safe ports or 
places where she can safely lie afloat.” 
 
However, it is possible for the parties to agree to changes in the standard 
clauses. For example, in the court case The “Dagmar,”31 the charterparty 
was based on a Baltime wording with the following amendments: 
 
The vessel to be employed in lawful trades for the carriage of lawful 
merchandise only between good and safe ports or places where she can safely 
lie always afloat or safe aground where vessels of similar size and draft are 
accustomed to lie in safety. 
 
Hence, the wording still indicates an express warranty; however, it has been 
extended to also include “lying safely aground”, hence, the vessel must not 
always be afloat.  
 
2.2.1.1.4 NYPE 9332 
In clause 5, the wording is indicating an express warranty as the trading is to 
be “between safe ports and safe places”. Further, clause 12 stipulates that 
also the berths should be safe: 
 
The vessel shall be loaded and discharged in any safe dock or at any safe 
berth or safe place that Charterers or their agents may direct, provided the 
Vessel can safely enter, lie and depart always afloat at any time of tide. 
 
2.2.1.1.5 Shelltime 433 
As mentioned above in section 2.2, it is common in many time charters for 
tankers to agree on a more extensive clause in relation to safe ports. It 
usually provides that charterers are obliged only to exercise due diligence to 
ensure that the vessel is employed between safe ports.
34
 An example is the 
wording regarding safe ports in the Shelltime 4: 
 
Charterers shall use due diligence to ensure that the vessel is only employed 
between and at safe  places (which expression when used in this charter shall 
include ports, berths, wharves, docks, anchorages, submarine lines, alongside 
vessels or lighters, and other locations including locations at sea) where she 
can safely lie always afloat. Notwithstanding anything contained in this or 
any other clause of this charter, Charterers do not warrant the safety of any 
place to  which they order the vessel and shall be under no liability in respect 
thereof except for loss or  damage caused by their failure to exercise due 
diligence as aforesaid. 
                                                 
30
 The Bimco Uniform Time Charterparty Box Layout 1974 (Baltime). 
31
 Tage Bergland v. Montoro Shipping Corporation Ltd (The “Dagmar”), 1968, 2 Lloyds 
Rep 563. 
32
 New York Produce Exchange Form 1913, amended 1993, (NYPE 93). 
33
 Shelltime 4, Issued December 1984 amended December 2003.  
34
 Presentation by Mr. Smith, Mills and Co. Solicitors. 
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2.2.1.2 Voyage charter 
Under a voyage charter, the shipowner and the charterer agree that the 
vessel shall carry a specified cargo on an agreed voyage in exchange for 
freight.
35
 Hence, the owners have more control of the vessel in comparison 
with time charters. 
 
Two examples of standard voyage charterparties follow in the two 
subsections. 
 
2.2.1.2.1 Gasvoy36 
 
In clause 2 of the charterparty it is stated that the loading and discharging 
place may vary depending on the agreement; however, it should always be a 
safe place which indicates an express warranty:  
 
Vessel shall proceed…to a safe berth, dock, anchorage, submarine line, 
alongside a vessel or vessels or lighter or lighters or any other place 
whatsoever as ordered by Charterers within the limits specified in Box 19 or 
so near thereto as she may safely get, lie and depart from, always afloat... 
 
2.2.1.2.2 Intertankvoy 7637 
In line with the Shelltime 4 on the time charterparty side, also the 
Intertankvoy 76 has a due diligence wording which disclaims the charterers’ 
liability as long as he acts with due diligence: 
 
Charterers shall exercise due diligence to ascertain that any places to which 
they order the vessel are safe for the vessel and that she will lie there always 
afloat. Charterers shall, however, not be deemed to warrant the safety of any 
place and shall be under no liability in respect thereof except for loss or 
damage caused by their failure to  exercise due diligence as aforesaid. 
 
 
2.2.1.3 Bareboat charter 
As already mentioned in the purpose and scope in section 1.2, the bareboat 
charter is not under the same conditions as for the time- or voyage charters 
and will not be closer analysed. However, it is worth mentioning that the 
bareboat charterer is, in comparison with the voyage- and time charterer, 
taking more control of the vessel as he equips, crews and trades the vessel 
for his own account.
38
 In other words, he therefore takes over the functions 
                                                 
35
 Coghlin et al, Time charters, 6 ed, London, Informa, 2008, p. 2. 
36
 The Bimco Gas Voyage Charterparty, Issued 1972 (Gasvoy). 
37
 The Bimco Tanker Voyage Charteroarty (Intertankvoy 76). 
38
 Hans Jacob Bull & Thor Falkanger, Innföring I Sjörett, 6 ed, Oslo, Sjörettsfondet, 2004, 
p. 222. 
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of the owner and the common border between shipowner and charterer is set 
aside. 
 
 
2.3 What makes a port unsafe? 
The main rule to decide whether a port is unsafe or not derives from a 
leading English court case of 1958 named The “Eastern City” 39 where the 
following statement was expressed by Lord Justice Per Sellers:  
 
…port will not be safe unless, in the relevant period of time, a particular ship 
can reach it, use it and return from it without, in the absence of some 
abnormal occurrence, being exposed to danger which cannot be avoided by 
good navigation and seamanship.  
 
Hence, it is apparent that there are several requisites for the port to be 
considered safe. This chapter will focus mainly on the part relating to “reach 
it, use it and return from it without…being exposed to danger”. 
Accordingly, the remaining requisites will be handled in the following 
chapters.  
 
Courts have held that whether a port or berth is unsafe or not is a matter of 
fact and degree.
40
 The port’s characteristics, both temporary and permanent, 
must be safe for the vessel.
41
 However, a temporary danger does not 
automatically render a port unsafe. For example, a danger relating to an 
ordinary neap tide would probably not make the port unsafe
42
 while, on the 
other hand, a temporarily broken navigational light could render the port 
unsafe if connected with the system of the port.
43
 
 
The vessel should also, beside from using the port, be able to get to the port 
and depart safely
44
. This will be further discussed in the subsections 2.3.1 
and 2.3.3. However, the port does not have to be safe for continues use, as 
long as there are adequate warning systems in place to enable the ship to 
leave safely if a danger occurs. Hence, a port can be considered safe, despite 
unsafe characteristics, if the charterers have provided the owners with 
sufficient warning to enable the vessel to avoid them. There will be several 
references to relevant case law in the following subsections.
45
 It is also 
worth noting that it is the system that has to be adequate, a mistake by a 
                                                 
39
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lloyd’s Rep 127, p. 131. 
40
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41
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42
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43
 See further in section 2.3.1. 
44
 Limerick Steamship Company LTD v. W.H. Stott & Co (The “Inishboffin”), 1920, 5 
Lloyds Rep 190. 
45
 See further The “Evia” in section 2.3.1, as well as The “Dagmar” and The “Eastern City” 
in section 2.3.3. 
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competent individual in an otherwise functioning system does not render a 
port unsafe.
46
 
 
A safe port obligation also means that the berth, dock or wharf which the 
vessel is directed to shall be safe; however, it does not mean that every spot 
in the port must be safe.
47
 In the court case The “Terneuzen” from 1935, the 
judge stated the following
48
: “…the word “port” or “place” [is] to be 
deemed to include that part of the port or place which is a berth.” 
 
Hence, if the charterers order a vessel to a port, they have also a duty to 
direct the vessel to a safe place within the port.
49
 
 
As mentioned above, there are different dangers that can render a port 
unsafe. Some examples of dangers will briefly be described in the following 
subsections.
50
 
 
 
2.3.1 Defective berthing facilities and 
navigational aids 
One of the most common ways to describe an unsafe port would perhaps be 
a physical defect of the berth itself. However, there are plenty of other 
attributes to render a port unsafe, which will be reviewed in the following 
sections.  
 
A physical defect, which could render the port unsafe, would, for example, 
be the lack of proper fenders and hauling-off buys as in The “Houston 
City”51, which will be more carefully examined in section 2.3.3. It could 
also be insufficient fendering while heavy winds are pushing the vessel 
against the quay as in The “Khian Sea”52, which will also be reviewed 
further in section 2.3.3. 
 
In the old court case from 1920, The “Innisboffin”53, the vessel was ordered 
to Manchester where she was to discharge her cargo. On the way to and 
from the port, she had to pass under a couple of bridges. During the voyage 
to the port, she was laden and it was no problem to pass under the bridges; 
however, when she was returning in ballast condition the draught of the 
                                                 
46
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47
 Boyd et al., Scrutton on Charterparties, 21 ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008, p. 120. 
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vessel made it impossible to pass the bridges due to the vessel’s height. The 
vessel accordingly had to cut off the mast in order to safely continue the 
voyage. The judge held that the port was to be considered unsafe to the 
particular vessel
54
. 
 
Another attribute apart from a physical defect at the berth could be 
defective, or absence of, navigational aids such as lights and buoys etc.
55
  In 
the court case The “Count”56, the judge held that misalignments of 
navigational buoys did render the port unsafe. 
 
Just because a physical danger exists does not necessarily make the port 
unsafe. If, for example, a sandbank is properly marked by navigational 
buoys and lights then the sandbank should not be considered to render the 
port unsafe. On the other hand, temporary dangers, such as, for example, 
broken navigation lights or alike, could render the port unsafe.
57
 
 
The key is whether there is a working system at the port. Hence, should, for 
example, a light be broken and then repaired within a reasonable time the 
system is most likely to be considered adequate and it should not be a 
reason for an unsafe port argument. If the system is considered adequate but 
breaks down due to a human error, which is a one-time occurrence, then it 
still would probably not be considered unsafe.
58
 In The “Evia” the judge 
stated
59
:  
 
To elaborate a little, every port in its natural state has hazards for the ships 
going there. It may be shallows, shoals, mudbanks, or rocks. It may be storms 
or ice or appalling weather. In order to be a "safe port", there must be 
reasonable precautions taken to overcome these hazards, or to give sufficient 
warning of them to enable them to be avoided. There must be buoys to mark 
the channel, lights to point the way, pilots available to steer, a system to 
forecast the weather, good places to drop anchor, sufficient room to 
manoeuvre, sound berths, and so forth. In so far as any of these precautions 
are necessary - and the set-up of the port is deficient in them - then it is not a 
"safe port". 
 
In The “Marinicki”60, the vessel suffered damage when she hit an object in 
the dredged channel on the way to the port. The judge held that because 
there was no proper system in place to check or monitor the safety of the 
channel to the port, or to warn traffic using the channel, the port was to be 
considered unsafe. 
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2.3.2 Inadequate channels 
A port could be deemed unsafe even if the danger itself is not within the 
actual port limits. Dangers that are likely to occur on the way to and from 
the port may also affect the safety.
61
 In the case The “Hermine”62 the vessel 
was delayed in the port of Destrehan, located 140 NM upstream the 
Mississippi River, due to the fact that there was not sufficient water depth in 
the river for the laden vessel, and later that another vessel had grounded 
further down the river making it impossible for The “Hermine” to pass. It 
was held that even though the obstacle was almost 100 NM downstream 
from the port, the grounded vessel and the lack of water was still a danger 
connected to the port. It is though essential that the danger is linked with the 
use of the nominated port.  
 
Evidently, the danger could be situated a long distance away from the port, 
but in The “Hermine”, the judges were not entirely unanimous as to how far 
away a danger still could be connected to the port. However, it should not 
matter about distance if it is the only way of getting to the port. 
 
In the court case G.W. Grace & Co. Ltd. v. General Steam Navigation 
Company Limited, also called The “Sussex Oak”, from 195063, which is 
further mentioned below in section 2.3.5, the vessel was damaged by ice in 
the river Elbe on route to Hamburg and the judge held that: 
 
It is immaterial in point of law where the danger is located, though it is 
obvious in point of fact that the more remote it is from the port the less likely 
it is to interfere with the safety of the voyage. The charterer does not 
guarantee that the most direct route or any particular route to the port is safe, 
but the voyage he orders must be one which an ordinarily prudent and skilful 
master can find a way of making in safety. 
 
In this particular case, the only route to Hamburg was by the river Elbe, and 
hence the court found it applicable to test the unsafe port criteria for the 
location. 
 
This view was also held and further clarified in The “Mary Lou”64 where the 
judge stated that: 
 
Certainly it is not easy to accept at first sight the idea that hazards existing 
nearly one hundred miles away can be treated as features of the port. But 
logically the distance should make no difference, although the further away 
the obstacle, the less likely it will be that there is no alternative route which 
will enable the ship to reach the port in safety. 
 
 
                                                 
61
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2.3.3 Lack of shelter, and room to manoeuvre, 
in bad weathers 
If a port can not offer adequate protection against sea and swell, or the wind, 
the vessel may suffer damage as a result of, for example, the vessel being 
pushed against the berth or drift aground. It could also lead to damage to the 
berth which the berth owners may claim against the vessel’s owners. When 
a port is considered unsafe due to this particular attribute, it is due to the 
condition of a certain place in the port and not the port itself.
65
 However, as 
more thoroughly discussed in section 2.3, the charterers have nonetheless an 
obligation to direct the vessel within the port.   
 
Adequate protection against sea, swell and wind does not mean that the 
berth must necessarily be sheltered by breakwaters or alike. In the case The 
“Houston City”66 the vessel was ordered to a port in Australia where, at the 
specific berth, a hauling-off buoy and about fifty feet of the upper walling-
piece was missing. When the vessel berthed, the weather was calm and the 
forecast did not indicate any deterioration, however, soon the wind was 
increasing to a gale and the vessel and berth suffered damage by the vessel 
bumping against the berth. The judge held that although the berth was 
considered generally safe, the absence of the hauling-off buoy and waling-
piece made it unsafe in the prevailing weather, which was normally to be 
expected during the winter months. Hence, in this matter the absence of a 
buoy and proper fender system made the port unsafe rather than the berth 
actually being exposed by wind and swell.  
 
Further, even if there are no physical deficiencies as in The “Houston City”, 
the mere fact that the vessel is not warned about forthcoming heavy winds, 
which upon arrival makes it impossible for the vessel to depart safely, could 
mean that a port is considered unsafe.
67
  
 
The berth does not necessarily have to be considered unsafe if the vessel has 
to leave due to bad weather.
68
 In the first instance of the court case The 
”Eastern City”69 the judge stated that: 
 
I think theoretically it is possible for a port to be safe even though ships have 
to leave it in certain states of the weather, provided that all the operations of 
entering it, going out of it, re-entering it, loading and going out again, can be 
safely performed, and provided also that there is no appreciable danger of a 
ship being trapped by the sudden onset of bad weather. 
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The statement was further elaborated in the court case Islander Shipping 
Enterprises S.A. v. Empresa Maritima Del Estrado S.A. (The “Khian Sea”) 
from 1979, where the vessel was berthed in Valparaiso, Chile, when the 
weather was deteriorating and the vessel became exposed to heavy swell. 
The vessel was properly warned about the approaching weather in way of a 
red light, which was displayed at the port, and did therefore call for tugs and 
pilots in order to leave the berth and avoid damage to the vessel. However, 
when the pilot had boarded and the tugs were alongside, it turned out that 
two other vessels had anchored sufficiently close to the berth making it 
impossible for The “Khian Sea” to leave until the both vessels had been 
moved. While waiting for the two vessels to move the vessel suffered 
damage by striking the pier structure.  
 
As already mentioned in section 2.3, the port must have an adequate 
warning system to enable vessels to leave the port should it suffer bad 
weather. In The “Khian Sea” the judge stated that there are four 
requirements that have to be satisfied when a vessel has to leave its berth. In 
addition to an adequate warning system, there must also be adequate 
availability of pilots and tugs
70
, adequate sea room to manoeuvre, and 
finally, an adequate system for ensuring that the sea room and room for 
manoeuvre is always available.
71
 In The “Khian Sea” the judge held that the 
first two criteria were satisfied; however not the third and fourth. Firstly, 
there was not enough room to manoeuvre at the crucial time, and secondly, 
not an adequate system to allow the vessel to navigate freely in bad weather. 
Hence, the port was deemed unsafe. 
 
 
 
2.3.4 Absence or incompetence of tugs or 
pilots 
It does not have to be a physical danger that renders a port unsafe; also 
organisational shortcoming could be a danger of the port.
72
 Organisational 
dangers are associated with the organisation and systems adopted at the 
port; however, it must not necessarily be connected with the port authorities. 
 
For example, should a vessel ground due to a pilot error it could be held that 
it was an occasional mistake by the pilot and that it would fall under the 
shipowners’ responsibility as the pilot generally is acting as a servant or 
employee of the owners. Should it, on the other hand, turn out to be a 
recurring error by the pilot or the pilots then it could be held that the 
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incompetence of the pilots is a characteristic of the port and that it 
constitutes an unsafety of the port.
73
  
 
Also, absence of tugs could be considered as an organisational shortcoming. 
In the court case The “Universal Monarch”74 the port was deemed unsafe 
due to the fact that not enough tugs were available during berthing. In the 
noted case, the pilots demanded that six tugs were to be used to berth a 
vessel of The “Universal Monarch’s” size while only three were available at 
the port. Hence, three extra tugs had to be ordered from a nearby port for 
which the owners were charged with the extra costs. The port was deemed 
unsafe to the specific vessel due to the absence of tugs and the owners 
recovered the extra costs from charterers.  
 
The same conclusion was reached in the case The “Sagoland”75, where the 
vessel was ordered to Londonderry, and where the river bends made it 
unsafe for Sagoland due to her length to go in and out under her own steam. 
There were no available tugs in Londonderry or in the vicinity, and hence 
the judge held that the port was deemed unsafe for the vessel. 
 
In The “Mary Lou”76 an issue was a system under which compulsory river 
pilots determine drafts necessary to permit safe passage of ships. The court 
analysed whether a failure of that system could render a berth to be unsafe, 
considering a number of prior cases, including The “Dagmar”77 and The 
“Khian Sea”78: 
 
Each of these cases depended on the concept that a port could be 
conditionally safe. Such a port may have geographical, climatic or other 
characteristics which entail that it will be safe if, but only if, a particular 
system for securing its safety remains effectively in operation: for example, a 
system for obtaining and publishing adequate weather forecasts, or for 
supplying tugs, or for ensuring adequate sea room for manoeuvring. Such a 
port will be safe if the system works properly, and unsafe if it does not. 
 
In other words, a system, including supply of adequate tugs, may in certain 
circumstances render a port unsafe if such system fails. 
 
 
2.3.5 Ice 
Ice could be dangerous to the vessel in several ways. For example, ice could 
affect the seaworthiness as it can form on vessel’s structure, and hence 
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cause instability. There is further a risk that ballast water freezes and the 
cargo lifting capacity will decrease. However, the most common danger to 
the vessel relating to ice is probably hull, propeller and rudder damage due 
to striking of ice while navigating. Depending on the vessel, some are more 
resistant to ice than others and there is also a specific ice class which states 
how thick ice the vessel is designed to force. Also, it differs if the vessel is 
in ballast or laden in way of efficiency going through ice.  
 
In The “Sussex Oak”79, the judge held that the port of Hamburg was 
considered to be unsafe due to the presence of ice in the river Elbe. The 
judge established that the master had not acted negligently as not much ice 
was encountered when entering the river, and that when the vessel was 
finally held up by the ice there was no alternative for the master other than 
to continue the voyage. As the judge further established:  
 
The place where the vessel was held up was a narrow part of the river. The 
master could not have turned round and gone back because the propeller or 
rudder would probably have been damaged by the ice in so doing, or might 
even have been lost. He could not go astern for more than a short distance for 
the same reasons, and he could not anchor in that place. If he had tried to 
remain where he was, he would have been carried towards Pagan Sand, and 
there would have been serious risk of the vessel stranding. 
 
It does not always have to be the presence of ice that makes a port unsafe. In 
the court case The “Livanita”80 it was rather the ice blocks caused by an 
icebreaker that caused the unsafety and damage to the vessel. 
 
As stated above in section 2.3 a port could be deemed unsafe even if the 
danger is only of a temporary nature. In regards to ice, the courts have held 
that if a delay due to ice is frustrating the commercial purpose of the 
charterparty it will not be considered temporary, and hence the berth will be 
considered unsafe. For example, should a vessel fixed on a voyage charter 
where the stay at a berth would normally take two weeks, and upon arrival 
of the port the same is iced up for the winter, it would be considered a 
frustration of the charter’s commercial purpose.81 
 
There are standard ice clauses that can be used in charterparties, which state 
that the master is not forced to proceed when, for example, navigational 
marks have been removed for the winter, if the port is icebound or there is a 
risk that the vessel cannot safely enter or leave the port on accounts of ice.
82
 
In some voyage charterparties, the owners have the right to cancel the 
charterparty should there be an obstruction of ice.
83
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that a port that would naturally be icebound 
for a certain period during the year is not necessarily icebound within the 
meaning of an ice clause, and is hence not automatically considered unsafe, 
if the port is kept open by icebreakers.
84
 
 
 
2.3.6 Warlike activities and political dangers 
Another non-physical possible danger is political unsafety, for example 
seizure by governments due to embargo, warlike activities, capturing by 
pirates or enemies as well as threats of the same. 
 
In the old case from 1861, Ogden v Graham
85
, the vessel The “Respigadera” 
was chartered to proceed from England to a safe port in Chile, which was to 
be decided upon calling Valparaiso. On the arrival at Valparaiso the 
charterers directed her to Carrisal Bajo for discharging. However, at the 
time of the order the port in Carrisal Bajo was closed under the order from 
the Chilean Government, and the ship could not call there without being 
confiscated. The ship was therefore detained for a while in Valparaiso 
pending the re-opening of the port in Carrisal Bajo. The judge held that the 
port was not safe, as the vessel could not enter it without being confiscated 
by the government of the place. The judge held: 
 
I think that, on the construction of this charterparty, the charterers are bound 
to name a port which, at the time they name it, is in such a condition that the 
master can safely take his ship into it; but, if a certain port be in such a state 
that, although the ship can readily enough so far as natural causes are 
concerned, sail into it, yet, by reason of political or other causes, she cannot 
enter it without being confiscated by the Government of the place, that is not 
a safe port within the meaning of the charterparty. 
 
Accordingly, a port can be deemed unsafe if the unloading of the cargo is 
prohibited by law, or if the port cannot be reached without the vessel 
running the risk of a hostile capture. 
 
In the more recent case The “Greek Fighter”86, from 2006, the vessel was at 
anchor off Khorfakkan, UAE, where she loaded and discharged oil from 
smaller tankers. The UAE coastguard then arrested the vessel on the basis 
that Iraqi oil was loaded onboard, which at the time was illegal. The vessel 
was subsequently confiscated and sold at the public auction. The 
charterparty was based on Shelltime 4 and stated that “No voyage shall be 
undertaken, nor any goods or cargoes loaded, that would expose the vessel 
to capture or seizure by rulers or governments”87. Accordingly, the court 
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held that the port of Khorfakkan was unsafe as the cargo loaded onboard 
was considered as contraband due to its origin.  
 
The unsafety can also be connected to war and warlike activities, as, for 
example, in the early case the Palace Shipping Co v. Gans Steamship Line
88
 
from World War One. In 1915, the German Government had declared the 
waters around Great Britain as a military area where all hostile merchant 
vessels were to be attacked and destroyed by German war vessels. The 
vessel, which sailed under the British flag, was ordered from Le Havre to 
Newcastle; however, the owners refused on the grounds that the port of 
Newcastle was not safe. It later turned out that the Germans fell short of 
their promise and as the judge stated when commenting on the result of the 
German threat: “it is impossible to regard the results achieved as other than 
insignificant”. 
 
The judge held that, although dangers encountered on the way to the port 
could render the port unsafe, and that one reason could be enemy attacks, 
the German threat was not carried into effect by the German Government 
and Newcastle was in fact a safe port.  
 
In The “Saga Cob”,89 the Commercial Court held that the port of Massawa 
was prospectively unsafe, at the time the order to proceed to the port was 
given, due to the fact that the vessel’s approach to the port could be subject 
to seaborne attacks. The Court of Appeal, however, held that although a 
seaborne attack was foreseeable, there had been no other attacks for about 
three months, and that the former attack was considered to be an isolated 
event. The judges therefore meant that it was not correct that an attack, or 
even the risk of an attack, was a normal characteristic of the port. Hence, 
just because a risk is foreseeable does not mean that it should be considered 
as a characteristic of the port.
90
 The Court of Appeal raised that the question 
should be whether a reasonable shipowner, knowing the facts with regards 
to the safety of the port, would decide to take his vessel there. As one of the 
judges stated
91
: 
 
…one is considering whether a port should be regarded as unsafe by owners, 
charterers or masters of vessels. It is accepted that this does not mean that it 
is unsafe unless shown to be absolutely safe. It will not, in circumstances 
such as the present, be regarded as unsafe unless the political risk is sufficient 
for a reasonable shipowner or master to decline to send or sail his vessel 
there. 
 
Hence, the above statement infers that a reasonable shipowner must accept 
some degree of political risk, and that the port is not unsafe if only that 
degree of risk is present. The port would only be considered unsafe if the 
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risk is such that a reasonable master or shipowner would decline to send or 
sail his vessel there.
92
 
 
In a court case one year after The “Saga Cob”, named The “Chemical 
Venture”93, the judge held, in contrast to the above case, that the port Mina 
Al Ahmadi, Kuwait, was deemed unsafe due to the vessel being hit by a 
missile from an Iranian jet fighter. The premise was however slightly 
different in this case as three tankers had been attacked by Iranians jets 
during eleven days before The “Chemical Venture” was attacked. Hence, 
the judge held that an attack was not an isolated, abnormal or unexpected 
event, but a characteristic of the port at that time.   
 
Two other matters referring to the Iran-Iraq War is The “Evia”94 and The 
“Lucille”95. The two vessels got trapped in the port of Basrah as the only 
route out of the port was blocked for traffic due to the outbreak of the war. 
In the former case, the judge held that the port was safe while in the latter 
the judge held that the port was deemed unsafe. The different outcome in the 
two decisions lies in the meaning of “prospectively safe” which will be 
handled further in section 2.4. 
 
Another issue relevant to the issue of unsafety is corruption. At some ports, 
officials may cause difficulties for the vessel unless they are bribed. In 
recent years, more legislation has been introduced in order to prohibit such 
practices. One example is the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act from 2010 
which makes bribery of a foreign official a specific offence. Accordingly, if 
arbitrators or courts previously have held that confiscation or delay of a 
vessel that could be avoided by payment of a “reasonable” bribe did not 
make the port unsafe it is now a high probability that the same situation 
would be considered as an unsafe element.
96
 
 
 
2.3.7 Delays 
The risk that a vessel is seriously delayed can in some situations constitute 
unsafety. In the above-mentioned
97
 The “Lucille” where the vessel was 
trapped due to the outbreak of war, the judge held that the delay rendered 
the port unsafe. As stated above
98
, the presence of ice making it impossible 
for the vessel to leave or to get to the port could also render unsafety. 
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In the court case The “Count”99 the vessel was voyage chartered to the port 
of Beira, Mozambique, when she upon arrival was delayed by two other 
vessels that grounded at the same location which caused a blockage in the 
channel making it impossible to pass. The first vessel grounded the same 
day The “Count” tendered her notice of readiness which led to a six-day 
delay before The “Count” was able to make it to a discharge berth. The 
second vessel then grounded during the discharging operation, however was 
not refloated until four days after completion of discharging, making the 
total delay of ten days for The “Count”. The loss that owners had suffered as 
a result of delay was claimed against charterers as they argued that the port 
was unsafe due to the blockage. The cause of the two groundings was due to 
misalignment of navigational buoys in the access channel to the port. The 
judge held that the misalignment resulted from the absence of an adequate 
system to monitor changes in the channel. The judge further held that the 
delay was of such significance that he held the port unsafe.   
 
It is important to find the line between an accepted delay and a delay 
making the port unsafe. The delay must be of such duration as it frustrates 
the charterparty or involves inordinate delay.
100
 Hence, for example, neap 
tides, which is a common occurrence in many ports, that may cause a delay 
is not enough to breach the commercial deal as it only lasts for a limited 
period of time. In The “Hermine”101 from 1979 the judge stated:  
 
…the governing test determining whether the delay is sufficient to justify the 
result for which the shipowners concerned contended must be such delay as 
will frustrate the commercial adventure. 
 
Accordingly, how to interpret the length of a delay in order to render the 
port unsafe depends on what type of a charterparty that the vessel is engaged 
in. For example, a time charterparty for a longer period would be less 
sensitive than a time charterparty for a shorter period. Likewise, a temporary 
obstacle, which will merely involve the ship in a non-frustrating delay, will 
not render the port unsafe.
102
 
 
The stance held in The “Hermine“ was later confirmed in The “Count” from 
2008 where the judge stated
103
: 
 
A port will not lack the characteristics of a safe port merely because some 
delay, insufficient to frustrate the adventure, may be caused to the vessel in 
her attempt to reach, use and leave the port, by some temporary evident 
obstruction or hazard…That is different from the situation where the 
characteristics of the port at the time of the nomination are such as to create a 
continuous risk of danger. 
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2.4 Prospectively safe 
In The “Evia”, the judge held that the port must be “prospectively safe”104. 
The reason behind the wording is to establish the charterer’s responsibility 
as to when and to what degree he must seek information about the port to 
which he directs the vessel. 
 
The obligation for the charterer to nominate a safe port is primarily related 
to the moment when the order is given, i.e. at the nomination. However, the 
port must not be safe at the time of the order, but at the time the vessel 
actually approaches or enters the port.
105
 Instead of the word 
“prospectively” one could use “anticipated”, i.e. when the charterer gives 
the order to go to a specific port it is the anticipated status of the port that is 
relevant.
106
  
 
If charterers have complied with their initial obligation to nominate a port 
which is prospectively safe, and that port becomes unsafe whilst the vessel 
is on its way there, or even whilst the vessel is at the port but is able to avoid 
the danger by leaving, the charterers are under a second obligation to cancel 
the original orders and to issue new orders directing the vessel to a 
prospectively safe port.
107
 In the court case The “Evia”108, the judge held 
that the nature of charterers’ obligation to direct the vessel to a new port 
when the vessel has already entered the first port and it subsequently 
became unsafe, depends on whether it forthwith would protect the vessel 
from danger. If it is not, then the charterer would not be under the secondary 
obligation. 
 
The port should be safe during the entire time when the vessel uses the port, 
including getting to and from the port. In the court case The “Mary Lou” the 
judge was referring to two previous cases, namely The “Dagmar” and The 
“Khian Sea”. He held that the port should remain safe during the stay and 
not only during the nomination:
109
 
 
A situation may well exist in which the system is in effective operation at the 
time of the nomination, but breaks down whilst the ship is actually within the 
port. The decision of Mr. Justice Mocatta in the former case, and the 
judgment of Lord Denning, M.R. in the latter are both to the effect that the 
charterer is liable for any resulting damage if the system breaks down while 
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the ship is in port, notwithstanding that the port was safe at the moment of 
nomination. 
 
On the contrary, should the port become unsafe after the use of the vessel, 
then the port would not be deemed as unsafe in the meaning of the 
charterparty.
110
 
 
Beside from the time relevance, the port must also be safe for the particular 
ship, which is also stated in the main rule in The “Eastern City”111. Hence, 
the fact that the port would be safe for ships of different sizes or 
characteristics is not relevant.
112
 It could, for example, be the vessel’s 
draught, length or height
113
 that makes it difficult or impossible to use the 
port safely. Also, ice could be a danger of various degrees depending on the 
vessel’s characteristics. Whereas some vessels withstand large quantity of 
ice, others need only encounter a little ice before being damaged. 
 
It is notable that the stance held by the judge in The “Eastern City” in regard 
to the need to look at the specific ship in question was already adopted in 
1932 where the judge stated the following in the court case The 
“Sagoland”114: 
 
Let not the findings of the umpire be misunderstood, it was not a finding that 
the Port of Londonderry was not an entirely safe port for 99 out of 100 or an 
even larger proportion of the ships that may seek to resort thereto, but merely 
that it was not a safe port for the ship in question, the “Sagoland”… 
 
This has also been confirmed in later decisions, such as The “Universal 
Monarch”115 where the port was held unsafe due to the insufficient number 
of tugs for berthing a vessel of her size. 
 
The assessment whether a port is safe or not is an objective one, hence it 
does not matter whether the charterer actually knew about the factors.
116
 
However, as mentioned in section 2.2, some charterparties might set out 
different rules. For example, in the charterparty Shelltime 4
117
 it is stated 
that the charterers will not be liable for any damages at all in respect of 
unsafe port unless failing to exercise due diligence. Hence, in these cases the 
extent of the charterers’ knowledge of the prospective safety of the port does 
become relevant.  
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2.4.1 Owners’ rights and obligations 
Owners are in principle bound by the contract, i.e. the charterparty, and have 
to obey charterers’ nomination. There are, however, situations where the 
owners have the right, and sometimes even an obligation, to refuse the 
charterers’ orders.  
 
If the charterers direct the vessel to an unsafe port, then the vessel, i.e. 
owners, may refuse to comply with the order.
118
 If the owners elect to 
proceed to the port despite that they know about the facts that give them the 
rights to reject orders, then they waive their further rights to later reject the 
charterers’ order. They do not however forfeit their rights to have their 
losses covered.
 119
  Hence, the owners can obey with the charterers’ order 
and later claim compensation for the damages incurred due to the unsafe 
port. If, however, the port that is nominated is obviously unsafe, then 
owners would be obliged to refuse the orders and failing of doing so would 
probably adventure the possibility to a recourse action.
120
 It is also worth 
mentioning that the owners may still have an obligation to go to a port even 
if the port is not yet safe, as the port still may be prospectively safe. 
 
When owners, by their words or action, represent that they will not enforce 
their rights to refuse to obey the order to go to an unsafe port they waive this 
right. Owners can also waive to claim for damages, however compared to 
waiving the right to refuse the order, it will usually take an unequivocal 
statement to waive a claim for damages. It is therefore much more difficult 
to waive the right for claiming damages than to refuse to continue to a 
port.
121
 For example, in the court case The “Evaggelos”122, the judge held 
that the agreement of extra war risk cover was not a waiver of a safe port 
obligation. 
 
 
2.5 Unexpected and abnormal occurences 
The main rule established in The “Eastern City”123 must be reiterated. As 
previously noted, in this case the judge stated that the port will not be safe 
unless the vessel can use it without, “in the absence of some abnormal 
occurrence, being exposed to danger...”.  
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An abnormal occurrence is an exceptional event that is not happening every 
year and is not a characteristic of the port.
124
 An example can be exceptional 
weather conditions not common for the port or a collision caused by 
negligent navigation of another vessel, unless the said collision is caused 
due to a feature of the port allowing negligent navigation. Also, 
unanticipated violent acts by combatants or saboteurs could be considered 
as an abnormal event.
125
 Such damage does not arise from the attributes of 
the port itself, and a further example is found in the court case The 
“Evia”:126 
 
…if the set-up of the port is good but nevertheless the vessel suffers damage 
owing to some isolated, abnormal or extraneous occurrence - unconnected 
with the set-up - then the charterer is not in breach of his warranty. Such as 
when a competent berthing master makes for once a mistake, or when the 
vessel is run into by another vessel, or a fire spreads across to her, or when a 
hurricane strikes unawares. The charterer is not liable for damage so caused. 
 
The question whether an occurrence is abnormal or unexpected should be an 
objective assessment. It should be unexpected by a reasonable person in his 
position, hence it does not have to be unexpected by the charterer himself.
127
 
What constitutes abnormality is a question of fact.
128
 
 
In the court case The “Khian Sea”129, the vessel was unable to leave the port 
due to two other vessels obstructing the port when bad weather occurred. 
The judge held that the port lacked a proper warning system.
130
 Charterers 
argued that the presence of two vessels was an abnormal occurrence and that 
the port should not be considered unsafe. The judge rejected the charterers’ 
argument and held that, in the absence of a system to ensure that vessels 
using the berth would have adequate searoom if they had to leave in a hurry, 
the berth would be plainly unsafe.
131
 
 
Conclusively, abnormal occurrences will not make a port unsafe; a port will 
be unsafe only if the danger derives from its own qualities or attributes. 
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2.6 Dangers avoidable by good navigation 
and seamanship 
There are dangers of some sort at almost all ports; however, dangers, which 
are avoidable by ordinary good navigation and seamanship, will not render 
the port unsafe. That is the starting point adopted by the judge in The 
“Eastern City”132. If the master acts negligently, then the charterers are 
released from liability if that act is sufficiently serious to break the 
connection between charterers’ order and the damage.133  The question is 
hence whether there is an element of negligence in the master’s  behaviour, 
which caused a break in the chain of causation. This can, for example, be 
the case when the master should have seen the danger himself, for instance a 
missing fender on a jetty, and should have refused to enter the berth. In the 
court case The “Houston City”134 the judge held that:  
 
To deny the defendants' proposition does not mean that a master can enter 
ports that are obviously unsafe and then charge the charterers with damage 
done. … There is also the rule that an aggrieved party must act reasonably 
and try to minimize his damage. A master who entered a berth which he 
knew to be unsafe (and which perhaps the charterer had nominated in 
ignorance of its condition) rather than ask for another nomination and seek 
compensation for any time lost by damages for detention, might find himself 
in trouble. 
 
This applies also when the master fails to exercise reasonable skill in 
leaving an unsafe port, and thus breaks the chain of causation.
135
 The legal 
test is whether the master acted reasonably while being on the “horns of 
dilemma”136, i.e. having to take a quick decision when confronted with a 
hazard. In the court case The “Polyglory”137 the judge held that if a vessel 
cannot navigate without exercising of more than ordinary care and skill then 
the port will not be safe: 
 
This means that when considering the question whether an order to proceed 
to a port is a breach of the safe port clause one relevant consideration is 
"could an ordinarily prudent and skilful master get there in safety?" If the 
answer is yes then at any rate as regards its approaches the port will be safe. 
Thus an assumption has to be made that ordinary care and skill will be used 
when the question of safety is being determined. 
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Even if the master acts negligently there is not automatically a ground to 
hold the charterers free from liability, the negligent act must also be 
causative. The judge Mr. Justice Mustill stated the following in the court 
case The ”Mary Lou”138: 
 
…the charterer does not, by showing that the ship was not handled with 
reasonable skill and care, necessarily dispose of the allegation that the port 
was unsafe. For the characteristics of the port may be such as to create a risk 
of danger even to a properly handled ship, and this may prove to have been 
the cause of the damage even if the ship could and should have been better 
navigated on the occasion in question… 
 
Aside from its relevance to the issue whether the port was unsafe, the conduct 
of the master may be material in two further respects:  
 
First, it is possible that his conduct may amount to the deliberate ignoring of 
a known or recognizable risk. As I have already suggested, an obvious danger 
does not make the port unsafe in the ordinary sense, although the loss caused 
by waiting until it has dissipated is recoverable as· a breach of the warranty; 
and if it cannot be circumvented, the vessel can properly refuse to visit the 
port. If the master nevertheless chooses to go ahead, in face of the known 
danger, his action may (but will not necessarily) have the effect of cutting the 
causal link between the order to the port and the loss.  
 
Second, if the ship is navigated without proper care, so that the ship 
succumbs to a danger which with better navigation might have been avoided, 
this again may have the effect of breaking the causal connection. But whether 
it does so is a question of fact, depending upon the magnitude of the risk 
created by the unsafe features of the port and the degree to which the actual 
navigation falls short of the desired standard... 
 
It is not only the negligence of the master that can break the link of 
causation. Also, the pilot’s actions can be applied to the master’s and 
owners’ responsibility. The general rule is that the owners are liable for the 
pilots as they are regarded as the servants of the owners. Accordingly, any 
negligence on the part of the pilot may therefore constitute a break in the 
chain of causation between the charterers’ order and the damage suffered.139  
 
There are, however, examples where the pilot’s negligence is not considered 
as an act of the owners’ servant, but is regarded as a characteristic of the 
port. In such a case, the pilot’s negligence will not break the chain of 
causation but will instead be one of the elements making the port unsafe. In 
the court case The “Stork”140 the local pilot reassured the master and 
recommended the master that the ship should remain at anchorage despite 
that the master expressed misgivings. The vessel suffered damage and it was 
found out that the pilot’s advice was wrong. It was held that the master had 
acted reasonably when he followed the pilot’s advice, and that no blame 
should be put on the master.  
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Thus, should it be found that there is a pilot error or negligence only, 
without any error or negligence found on the part of the master, there would 
be a reasonable argument that such an error or negligence should not be 
attributed to the shipowner, and hence should not break the chain of 
causation. 
 
As a comparison, it could be interesting to note that while the English courts 
would decide that the master’s or pilot’s action either will hold the owners 
responsible or not, under United States law the liability would be 
apportioned between the owners and charterers as to their respective degree 
of responsibility for the damage.
141
 
 
 
2.7 What is recoverable? 
The claims made normally in an unsafe port matter concern damage to the 
ship, such as cost of repair for physical damage. In addition, there could be a 
breach of contract due to loss of time or loss of use or alike, and economic 
loss is normally recoverable if it is foreseeable
142
. Also, third party liability, 
such as damage to berths, pipelines, cables etc. are recoverable should it be 
a result of the unsafe port.
143
 As an example in the court case The 
“Polyglory”144the judge held that the charterers were liable to reimburse 
owners the costs for a damaged underwater pipe, which the owners had 
settled with the pipe owners.  
 
The main rule is set out in The “Houston City” where the judge held:145 
 
The damages for any breach of warranty are always limited to the natural and 
probable consequences. The point then becomes one of remoteness of 
damage ; or if it is thought better to put it in Latin, the expressions novus 
actus interveniens and volenti non fit injuria are ready to hand. There is also 
the rule that an aggrieved party must act reasonably and 
try to minimize his damage. 
 
Owners could also suffer a loss in order to avoid further costs or avoid 
dangers. Also such costs could be recoverable from charterers if it is held 
that the costs were incurred due to an unsafe port. For example, in the court 
case The “Innisboffin”146 the vessel was unable to leave the port of 
Manchester after discharging due to her decreased draft and the canal 
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bridges. In order to continue she had to cut her mast off while transiting 
under the bridges and subsequently reattach the mast again. The judge held 
that the costs were recoverable by charterers. 
 
Another example is the court case The “Peerless”147 where the vessel was 
ordered by charterers to discharge a cargo of maize, however the draft was 
too great to allow her to berth at any tide with her full cargo. Instead, the 
cargo had to be lightered before the vessel finally could berth and owners 
were entitled to recover all lightering costs from charterers. 
 
In The “Sagoland”148 the vessel was ordered to discharge at Londonderry; 
however, due to the narrow winding approach to the port the vessel required 
tugs to enter. As there were no tugs available at Londonderry, the vessel had 
to call for tugs from the port of Clyde. It was held by the judge that the cost 
of the tugs were recoverable under an unsafe port claim. Almost the same 
situation was in The “Unviversal Monarch”149 where the vessel was too 
large to enter with the existing tugs and extra tugs had to be called from a 
port nearby. Also in this case the judge held the tug costs are to be 
recoverable.  
 
The conclusion from the above discussion is that the owners are entitled to 
also recover costs and expenses incurred in avoiding obvious dangers. 
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3 Scandinavian System 
3.1 Introduction 
A starting point when facing a legal problem will be to look at the statutory 
law together with its associated preparatory works. As mentioned in the 
purpose and scope, this thesis will only include Swedish and Norwegian 
law. The respective countries’ Maritime Codes150 are based on a joint 
preparation,
151
 and hence very similar to each other. Beside from the 
statutory law and preparatory works also doctrine and case law is used.  
 
It must be observed that the amount of cases related to unsafe ports are less 
frequent in Scandinavian law compared to English law
152
, and since most of 
the charterparties are based on the same wording
153
 regardless of the 
country,  it is natural to also consider the English case law. The conclusion 
reached by a judge would, however, not always be the same in Scandinavian  
law as in English law.
154
  
 
As mentioned in section 2.2.1 there are many different clauses in different 
types of charterparties which govern the legal position between the owners 
and charterers. The Scandinavian Maritime Codes reflect the principles 
originating out of the developments of these charterparties, and provide 
guidance on how to interpret the different clauses.
155
  
 
The main rule in Scandinavian law is to look at which party should bear the 
risk for the damage.
156
  
 
 
3.2 Warranties 
The Scandinavian countries have put less responsibility on the charterer in 
comparison to England where the courts consider that the charterer has 
warranted the safety in the nominated port unless something else is stated in 
the charterparty.
157
  A “safe port” description in the charterparty, i.e. when 
the port or ports which the vessel shall call is described as safe, will not 
automatically be interpreted as an express warranty under Scandinavian law. 
The description will instead be read as a delimitation of where the charterer 
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is allowed to nominate the vessel, in line with other provisions in the 
charterparty on the allowed trading area.
158
 
 
In the court case ND 1959.242 Hilde Storm, the judges, on the other side, 
held that the wording “safely always afloat” was considered as an express 
warranty; however, there are several other cases
159
 where such similar 
wordings have been rejected and currently the Hilde Storm case is probably 
considered as an exception.
160
  
 
As mentioned in section 3.1, the Scandinavian Maritime Codes provide 
guidance to the interpretation of commonly used clauses in the 
charterparties
161
. For example, in Baltime 1939 the clause 7 states that “The 
vessel to be re-delivered on the expiration of the charter in the same good 
order as when delivered to the charterers (fair wear and tear excepted)” 
 
This wording has not been interpreted as an expressed warranty from the 
charterer’s side.162 As mentioned above, also the clauses where it is stated 
that the vessel should lie “safely afloat” will be construed restrictively to the 
benefit of the charterer.  
 
In some charterparties
163
  it is expressly stated that the charterer’s liability 
should not be under an expressed warranty but under a due diligence 
responsibility. Hence, it is possible to agree on other rules, and the courts 
have held that it is also possible to interpret that the charterer has warranted 
the safety in a more specified way. 
164
 In the arbitration award ND 1989.296 
Uglen, the arbitrators held that the wording “afloat with no risks for damage 
to the craft and its propellers” was to be considered as a clear warranty as 
for the safety of the port. 
 
 
3.3 Negligence 
The Scandinavian Maritime Codes have separated the rules relating to time 
charters and rules relating to voyage charters. However, in both the 
Norwegian and Swedish Maritime Codes the relevant paragraphs 
concerning voyage charters
165
 have in the preparatory works
166
 been 
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referred to the rules under the time charter paragraphs
167
. Hence, all 
commentaries should be applicable to both types of charters. In accordance 
with the relevant law, in Scandinavia the principle of negligence is used. 
The advantage of using that principle is that the courts get a flexible formula 
to apply on each case; however, at the same time there is a risk for 
insufficient guidance.
168
 
 
According to the Maritime Codes, the charterer has the right to choose 
loading- and discharging port only if the port is suitable in regards to 
availability and safety. There is also a clarifying rule
169
 stating that if 
damage to the vessel has occurred, and the damage is caused by an unsafe 
port, then the charterer is liable for the damage unless he can show that he, 
or any of his servants, have not acted faulty or negligently.  
 
The starting point according to Scandinavian law is that the shipowner is to 
bear the risk of damage to his own vessel. If nothing else has been agreed in 
the charterparty, the charterer is free from liability even if he has ordered the 
vessel to an unsafe port, unless he has acted faulty or negligently and the 
damage is a result thereof.
170
 This view is held as the shipowner is 
considered to be responsible for navigational risk, and that he employs the 
crew and insures the vessel. The fact that it is the charterer who nominates 
the port has not been considered to justify an exception from the principal 
rule of risk allocation.
171
 In the arbitration award ND 1962.143 the 
arbitrators held that the grounding of the vessel was not due to negligence of 
the charterer as it was held that the master or possibly the pilot, who was 
considered to be a part of the shipowner’s responsibility, made a wrongful 
calculation of the vessel’s draft. 
 
When evaluating whether  the charterers, or any of their servants, have acted 
negligently it should be taken into consideration to what extent the 
shipowner should have been able to investigate and procure the relevant 
knowledge about the different ports the charterer have been given the option 
to choose between. The less number of ports the charterer can choose from, 
the more probable it is that the owner has been able to investigate the port or 
ports.
 172
 Therefore, the charterer’s liability is to some extent based upon his 
possibility to use the vessel, and that basis would disappear if he has no 
option to choose ports but is bound to named ports in the charterparty. 
173
 It 
could be, however, that the charterer has a better possibility than the 
shipowner to investigate the characteristics of a port, for example, a small, 
distanced port where he can use his local agents to assist him, and in that 
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case more responsibility is incurred on the charterer.
174
 It is not clear where 
the line goes, but the charterer would to a much greater extent be held 
responsible to procure knowledge if he owns the port himself.
175
  
 
The evaluation can also be affected if, for example, the master of the vessel 
disregards his duty to monitor the work onboard and by that contributes to 
the damage.
176
  
 
If the port becomes unsafe after the nomination the charterer will still be 
held liable if he has acted negligently, hence the obligation under the 
charterparty and under the Scandinavian law also includes upcoming or 
future dangers.
177
 If the unforeseeable danger has occurred after the 
nomination, but there is still time and possibility to issue new orders to 
avoid the danger, the charterers are obliged to do so if they know about it. 
Failing to do so would probably be considered negligent and made him 
liable for the damage. The former presumes that the shipowner was unaware 
of the danger, and some dangers would be easier for the master, and 
therefore the shipowner should be aware of, for example, wrecks or 
underwater stones, etc.
178
 
  
The shipowner has the right to decline going to an unsafe port
179
; however, 
as the result of not going to the port can be costly for the charterer, the risk 
is not to be imaginary.
180
 In the court case ND 1928.214 the charterparty 
stated that the vessel was to call three safe ports in the area Gothenburg – 
Århus. When the port of Ystad was nominated the master declined as he 
considered Ystad to be unsafe due to the size of the vessel, and the judges 
held that he had the right to do so. The master may not, however, refuse the 
order if the shipowner, when he agreed to the charterparty, reasonably 
should have considered that such a danger was likely to arise due to the 
specific voyage.
181
  
 
The master is further obliged to refuse to take the ship to a port, which is 
unsafe, otherwise the owners will lose their rights to claim for damages.
182
 
In the court case ND 1945.337 the entrance to the port was of a difficult 
nature, and since the master did inspect the place together with the pilot in 
advance he was considered to have accepted the risk. 
 
                                                 
174
 Ibid, p. 90. 
175
 ND 1962.143. 
176
 SOU 1990:13, Godsbefodran till sjöss, pp. 211-212. 
177
 Jan Ramberg, Unsafe ports and berths, Oslo, Universitetsförlaget, 1967, p. 90. 
178
 Hans Peter Michelet, Håndbok i Tidsbefraktning, Oslo, Sjörettsfondet, 1997, p. 83. 
179
 Proposition 1993/94:195, Om ny sjölag, p.272. 
180
 Jan Ramberg, Unsafe ports and berths, Oslo, Universitetsförlaget, 1967, p. 87. 
181
 SOU sid 206. 
182
 Jan Ramberg, Unsafe ports and berths, Oslo, Universitetsförlaget, 1967, p. 86. 
 39 
3.3.1 Burden of proof 
It might be presumed that the law states that the shipowner has been given a 
larger responsibility in regards to damage resulting from an unsafe port. In 
order to compensate for the shipowner’s increased liability, the law states 
that there is a reversed burden of proof, i.e. the charterer has been imposed 
to prove that he has not been negligent, and therefore not liable.
183
 The 
legislator has also motivated the reversed burden of proof by pointing out 
that the charterer has the disposition of the vessel and is the one planning 
the voyage by the assistance of his contacts with the local agents at the 
nominated ports.
184
 Hence, it is easier for a charterer to prove that he, or 
anyone else acting on his behalf, has not acted negligently. 
 
It is, nevertheless, for the shipowner to prove that the damage occurred due 
to an unsafe port and that there is causal link between the damage and the 
characteristics of the port. One example of case law is found in the court 
case ND 1972:183 Vale, where the vessel had just recently been drydocked 
with no visible damage when she entered the port of Gävle, Sweden. There 
she, according to the crew’s perception, touched ground during berthing 
manoeuvres. The master alerted the Port Authority about the incident; 
however, no underwater inspection was carried out until a month later when 
a diving inspection and subsequently drydocking was carried out. The 
drydock revealed damages to the hull and the machinery corresponding to 
consequences of a grounding. No other incidents apart from the one in 
Gävle had been reported or noted in the deck log book, which could indicate 
grounding; however, according to the Port Authorities they had dredged the 
port, and had proof thereof, to a depth that made it impossible for the Vale 
to ground. The court held that it is for the shipowner to prove that the 
grounding occurred, and since it could not be excluded that the damage 
happened in between the vessel leaving Gävle and was drydocked the 
second time, the shipowner’s claim was dismissed.  
 
 
3.4 Safe ports 
It must be observed that the definition of a ”safe port” under Scandinavian 
law is not as specified as in the English law.
185
 In the preparatory works
186
, 
the definition of a “safe port” is often described as being wide and not only 
connected with navigational risks, but also ports with risks for the crew in 
relation to epidemics and political unsafety. The legislator further states that 
the meaning under the law is, however, restricted to the characteristics of a 
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port that can cause damage to vessels. In the doctrine
187
 it could be found 
that the definition of a “safe port” is expended to “a port that at least 
protects the ship against such natural dangers which a good port normally 
should protect a ship against”. It is also stated the port should be 
prospectively safe.
188
 
 
In the court case ND 1928.108 it was held that an unmarked underwater 
concrete foundation in the port basin was considered a danger and made the 
port unsafe. Also, in the court case ND 1935:436 the judges did find that an 
unmarked underwater stone, which damaged the vessel’s propellers during 
entrance of the port, was considered a danger, which made the port unsafe. 
 
The fact that the ship may be exposed to danger on its way to or from the 
port does not necessarily make the port itself unsafe. Hence, the 
effectiveness of the principal rule seems to decrease outside the port itself, 
and it is harder to prove fault or neglect on the charterer’s side when the 
ship is approaching the port.
189
 
 
 
3.5 What is recoverable? 
Apart from costs for repairing the vessel following a physical damage, 
further costs can also be claimed from the charterers should they be held 
liable for an unsafe port. The case law provides a couple of examples of 
different allowed costs. In the ND1926.145 the charterers had directed the 
vessel to a port where the vessel’s draft made them load less then agreed in 
order for the vessel to safely depart. The judge held that the owners were 
entitled to dead freight for the part, which they could not load. Also, 
additional costs for tug boats where there are none available
190
 and loss of 
hire due to lack of ice breakers
191
 have been considered allowable. 
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4 Comparative Analysis 
In the proceeding chapters, the legal issues pertaining to unsafe ports and 
charterers’ liability has been described under the English and Scandinavian 
law. This chapter provides a comparative analysis between the two systems. 
 
It needs to be recalled that the criteria which have to be applied in 
determining whether a port is deemed to be safe or not are a matter of law; 
however, determination of safety is a matter of fact. The judge in the court 
case The “Stork”192 stated that “it is a question of fact, having regard to the 
circumstances of each particular case.” 
 
As follows from the above chapters, it is evident that determining the fact in 
a case will include detailed expert evidence in relation to navigation, 
seamanship, the port area, weather and several other factors. Hence, 
answering the question whether a port is safe or not is often far from 
straightforward. 
 
A starting point under both the English law and the Scandinavian law when 
evaluating whether the charterer can be held liable for an unsafe port, must 
be to analyse the charterparty in order to assess whether the parties have 
agreed on any special terms, either expressed warranties or, as under 
English law, if any warranties can be implied. While the English system 
seems to have a more devised and categorical way to determine the 
charterer’s liability, the Scandinavian law assumes the principle of 
negligence.  
 
Starting with the English system, once the charterparty has been reviewed 
and it has been established that there is an implied or expressed warranty 
from the charterer’s side that the called port shall be safe193, then the next 
step would be to find out if the port, or the nearby areas are safe or not.
194
 
The unsafety can appear as a physical danger, for example, as defective 
berthing facilities or lack of shelter, but also dangers arising out of political 
unsafety and delays can be considered connected to the charterer’s liability. 
The danger can be inside the port itself or on the way to port. Depending on 
the different entrance possibilities for the vessel and the distance from the 
port the charterer’s liability differs. Hence, if there are alternative routes 
which are safe then it is doubtful if the port is considered unsafe. The danger 
should be linked to the use of the port and the distance is not directly an 
issue; however, the further away from the port the more difficult it becomes 
to link the danger to the port.  
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Further, when it has been held that the port is unsafe it has to be proven that 
the port was unsafe in connection with the vessel’s actual call, i.e. that the 
port was prospectively unsafe.
195
 Owners have the right to call an unsafe 
port and still be able to claim for damages, unless the port was obviously 
unsafe, then they will lose this right.  
 
Even if it is held that the port was not obviously unsafe but still unsafe, and 
it was so in connection with the vessel’s call the charterer have still some 
possibilities to avoid liability. The first event is when the danger can be 
considered unexpected and abnormal and which will not be considered as a 
characteristic of the port.
196
 This could be compared to force majeure and 
would hence not fall under the charterer’s liability. The second event is a 
situation where a master reasonably should be able to avoid the danger. 
Hence the master’s negligence, but also sometimes the pilot’s negligence, 
will not fall under the charterer’s liability.197 
 
Under the Scandinavian law, on the other hand, the test whether the 
charterer is liable is based on the charterer’s negligence.198 The main rule is 
that the shipowner is responsible for his vessel and the navigation of the 
vessel. Thus, he would be held liable for damage to the vessel unless the 
charterer can be found negligent in his orders to direct the vessel to an 
unsafe port. The master is not allowed to call a port where he would think 
the vessel can be damaged, that would free the charterer from liability. In 
order to protect the shipowner to some more extent, the legislator has 
introduced a reversed burden of proof, hence it is for the charterer to show 
that he is not negligent if the vessel was damaged at an unsafe port.  
 
The legal regime regarding unsafe port is much less developed in 
Scandinavian law compared with English law, where there are a number of 
case law and different examples. In Scandinavian law, the definition is very 
general, the doctrine states that a safe port is “a port that at least protects the 
ship against such natural dangers which a good port normally should protect 
a ship against”199. This opens up for the court to decide more freely on a 
case-to-case basis. 
 
It is to be noted that Scandinavian law related to unsafe ports stems from the 
English law where it is common to apply the rule of negligence in tortious 
or other form of liability. However, in this particular area of law, the use of 
warranties is more common under the English law.
200
  
 
The definition in The “Eastern City”201, compared to a Scandinavian view, 
leads to a narrow definition of a “safe port”. At the same time, the charterer 
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would not be held liable to the same extent in Scandinavia as in England 
where the courts have put a greater burden on the charterer.
202
 Under 
English law it is evident that the owners would still have the right to claim 
damages from the charterers even if they decide to continue going to an 
unsafe port, unless this port is “obviously” unsafe.203 However, under 
Scandinavian law it seems that the danger does not have to be obvious to 
defeat the shipowners claim, it would be sufficient that the master believes 
that there is a certain probability that the vessel might become damaged if 
he would continue going to the port. 
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5 Conclusion 
Undoubtedly, the charterers’ liability for unsafe ports is a matter of 
importance. In this thesis an attempt has been made to demonstrate various 
factors that make a port unsafe. The approach to charterers’ liability in the 
English and Scandinavian law was presented and analysed. 
 
It follows from the previous chapters that there are two main solutions on 
how to approach the issue of charterers’ liability, namely a strict liability, 
which is the case in English law, and, liability based on negligence, as in 
Scandinavian law. While the English law system offers more cases, and 
hence makes it easier for courts to find guidance, the Scandinavian system is 
less developed, which adds a certain amount of uncertainty on the current 
legal position. In addition, the system of negligence is not as straightforward 
as the more categorised strict liability system. 
 
There are several arguments elucidating how the respectively parties should 
be liable for the damage to the vessel. For example, when there are several 
ports named in the charterparty, the charterer will be held liable to a greater 
extent. This could be explained by the fact that the charterer is allowed to 
take more advantage of the vessel, and hence should bear a greater risk. On 
the other hand, the charterer would hold that it is more favourable for the 
shipowner to bear the risk to his vessel as he insures and arranges for the 
crewing.
204
 It is, however, important to note that the insurances that the 
shipowner hold, such as, for example, hull and machinery insurance for the 
physical damage to the hull, or loss of hire insurance for the loss of income 
or prolongation of the voyage, also often have significant deductibles which 
will never be recovered. In addition, a damage under the insurance policy 
will most probably render increased premiums which the shipowner will 
suffer from. Hence, it can be argued that it is irrelevant who holds the 
insurance as there will always to some extent be a loss for the affected 
party.
205
 
 
It can be argued that an advantage by using strict liability is that it will force 
the charterer to use the vessel with a greater care, and hence make more 
research on the ports where the vessel shall call. On the other hand, it can 
also be argued that the shipowner is having a better nautical understanding, 
and would hence be in a better position to understand the dangers a port 
could render. This argument is to some extent limited as there is, even under 
strict liability, already an exemption for damage which a prudent master 
could avoid by using good seamanship.  
 
There is hence advantages and disadvantages with the both systems, and 
independently on which one of the two solutions is chosen it will always 
boil down to a question of fact in each case. 
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One contributing factor why the charterer’s liability issue is important, is 
because the harbour authorities are very seldom strictly liable for damage to 
the vessel and it is usually difficult to lodge a claim against the harbour.
206
 
Hence, the line between shipowner’s and charter’s liability must be clear. 
 
It does, however, not seem to be an easy task to divide the liability every 
time since the facts are different in each case, and by that the line is far from 
clear. One alternative could be a joint insurance, which is paid by both the 
shipowner and charterer, covering both parties for all damage resulting from 
dangers in the port. This could however turn out to be difficult as the 
different charterparties differ in length and number of port calls, where 
every port call increases the risk. It can also be very short term 
charterparties which make it difficult to arrange for insurance cover for each 
charterparty. 
 
Finally, in the view of this author another solution, and perhaps the most 
favourable one for all parties, would be to look at the offshore business 
where it is much more common to regulate the damage to each other’s 
property on a “knock for knock” basis, meaning that the damage is covered 
by the one it affects.
207
 Perhaps, by analogy this would be a way forward 
even for shipping business. It is also proposed that the shipowner is 
responsible for the repairs of the physical damage to the vessel; however, 
the charterer must stand the risk in relation to the time, i.e. the daily hire 
during the prolongation of the voyage in time charters and damages for 
detention in voyage charters. This would give incitement to both parties to 
act prudently and avoid dangers. 
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